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NOTE: AN EVALUATION OF THE
EFFECTS OF THE LEGALIZATION OF
MARIJUANA IN COLORADO AND
WASHINGTON FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
Aparna Bushan*

I. OVERVIEW
The legalization of marijuana in the states of Colorado and Washington has
raised issues that the international community has not previously been forced to
consider. Through examining relevant state laws, current federal legislation and
applicable international agreements, this Note will outline the legal ramifications
that the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington could have both
nationally and internationally. This Note will further evaluate all reasonable
alternatives available to the United States in meeting the requirements mandated
of it by the international agreements it is party to.
Main Issue

The United States’ national legislation is currently in conflict with the
international agreements it is party to. From a purely national perspective, the
federal legislation governing the United States has numerous discrepancies with
the recent laws in Colorado and Washington State regarding the usage of
recreational marijuana. 1 These discrepancies in national and state law in turn
have resulted in international consequences. As a party to various international
conventions that govern the use of marijuana, the United States has contravened
several convention provisions by allowing for the possession of marijuana. The
legalization of marijuana in two states now requires the United States to justify
its actions internationally in order to remain party to the affected international
agreements.2 Essentially, the conflict between state and federal law has resulted
in a divergence between the United States and the international agreements it is
committed to.
* H.B.A. (Richard Ivey School of Business, University of Western Ontario, 2015); J.D.
(University of Western Ontario, 2015); Student-at-Law, Harrison Pensa LLP, London,
Ontario.
1
See A Liberal Drift, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/
united-states/21565972-local-votes-suggest-more-tolerant-countrybut-not-more-left-wing-oneliberal-drift (positing that divergence in state law and federal law regarding the legalization of
medical marijuana in California may “spell trouble”) [hereinafter A Liberal Drift]. See also
Marijuana Resource Center: State Laws Related to Marijuana, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana.
2
Rep. of the Int’l Narcotics Control Bd. for 2012 UN Doc E/INCB/2012/1 at 80-83
(2013) [hereinafter INCB 2012 Report].
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Relevant Background Information

In order to appreciate the scope of the issue faced by the United States
internationally one must first recognize and understand the various drug control
conventions the United States is a party to. The United States is a signatory of
three different international agreements regarding the usage of illicit drugs: the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (“SCND”), 3 the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances (“CPS”),4 and the United Nations Convention against
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic-Substances (“1988 UN
Convention”).5
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)

All of the nations that are signatories of the SCND are required to make the
production, trade, and possession of illicit substances for non-scientific and nonmedicinal purposes a punishable offense. 6 Therefore, by permitting the
legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington, the United States violated
the agreement.
The objective of the SCND is to restrict worldwide possession, usage,
manufacturing and the trade and trafficking of drugs, with the exception of
certain substances that are to be used for purely medical and scientific purposes.7
The Convention classifies illicit drugs by categorizing them into four separate
schedules based on their common usages, features and corresponding levels of
control.8 Cannabis is classified as a Schedule I narcotic because of its addictive
properties that are perceived as presenting a serious risk of abuse from its users.9
It is also classified as a Schedule IV substance since it is viewed by the World
Health Organization as a drug within Schedule I that is particularly susceptible to
abuse and known to produce ill effects that are not offset by substantial
therapeutic advantages.10 Schedules I and IV are acknowledged as being the most
stringent categories and cover other drugs, including opium and coca. Ironically,
3

United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151
[hereinafter Single Convention].
4
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S.
175 [hereinafter CPS].
5
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S 95 [hereinafter 1988 UN Convention].
6
JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO
KNOW 145 (2012) [hereinafter WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW].
7
See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 4 at 4. Article 4 contains a description of the
“general obligations” of the parties to the treaty, including “ . . . to limit exclusively to medical
and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in,
use and possession of drugs.” Id.
8
Classification of Controlled Drugs, EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG
ADDICTION, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index146601EN.html.
9
Id.
10
See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(5), at 4. Article 3(5) grants the INCB the
power to place a drug on Schedule IV should the World Health Organization find that “a drug
in Schedule I is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects and that such liability is
not offset by substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances other than drugs
in Schedule IV.” Id.
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cannabis was listed Schedule IV due to pressure by the United States in the
United Nations.11 To monitor and support all the government’s party to the treaty
in achieving the convention’s goals, the SCND established the International
Narcotics Control Board (“INCB”).12
The INCB is an independent, quasi-judicial expert body that was established
in 1968. Its members serve impartially and currently enforce the provisions of
the SCND, the CPS and the 1988 UN Convention.13 The INCB’s duties include
questioning governments thought to have violated treaty provisions, proposing
remedial measures if governments are found to breach said provisions and, if
required, assisting governments in overcoming difficulties they may be facing in
enforcing treaty provisions.14 This requires close cooperation between the INCB
and the governments of the nations that are signatories of the conventions it
enforces. The INCB also publishes an annual report that outlines the yearly status
of the international drug control system and provides recommendations to
governments on areas of improvement in drug control.15 If the INCB discovers
that a government has not taken the measures necessary to remedy a situation, it
can call the matter to the attention of the parties concerned or remit the issue to
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations’ Economic and
Social Council.16 As a last measure, the treaties monitored by the INCB allow the
INCB to recommend that countries stop importing and/or exporting drugs from
the defaulting government body.17
CPS (1971)

The CPS was established in 1971 to address issues created by drugs that
were not covered by the SCND. Similar to the SCND, it too aims to implement
an international control system for the illicit substances governed by its

11

JAY SINHA, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEADING
INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS (2005), http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen
/committee/371/ille/library/history-e.htm.
12
See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 5, at 4-5. Article 5 establishes the INCB as an
“International Control Organ,” and art. 9 describes the “Composition and Function” of the
INCB. Id.
13
See Mandate and Functions, International Narcotics Control Board. http://www.incb.
org/incb/en/about/mandate-functions.html.
14
Int’l Drug Policy Consortium [IDPC], The International Narcotics Control Board:
Current Tensions and Options for Reform, IDPC Briefing Paper 7 (2008).
15
INCB Annual Report, supra note 2, at v.
16
See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(1)(d) at 8. Article 14(1)(d) states that “If
the Board finds that the Government concerned has failed to give satisfactory explanations
when called upon . . . or has failed to adopt any remedial measures which it has been called
upon to take . . . [the Board] may call the attention of the Parties, the Council and the
Commission to the matter.” Id.
17
See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(2), at 7. Article 14(2) grants the Board the
power, “if it is satisfied that such a course is necessary, [to] recommend to Parties that they
stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory
concerned . . . ” Id.
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provisions. 18 Although the United States is a signatory of this international
agreement, a further examination is unnecessary for the purposes of this Note as
the Convention does not speak to the national or international effects of the
legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington.
1988 UN Convention

The 1988 UN Convention supplements both the SCND and the CPS.19 The
Convention aims to end international drug trafficking through the promotion of
international cooperation between law enforcement bodies. It seeks to prevent
illicit trafficking, to promote the arrest and trial of drug traffickers, and deprive
drug traffickers of their profits.20 The legalization of marijuana in Colorado and
Washington has breached the 1988 UN Convention by allowing for the
production, distribution, sale and delivery of the illicit substance contrary to
Article 3(1)(a) of the Convention.21

II. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE AT HAND
To better understand the discrepancy in U.S. state and federal legislation a
detailed examination of the provisions that govern the two levels of government
is required.
The Federal Perspective on Marijuana

In 1970 the United States Congress introduced the Controlled Substances
Act as a way of nationally enforcing its SCND obligations. The CSA categorizes
all illicit substances under five schedules, with each schedule outlining the
18
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], A Century of International Drug
Control (2008), http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_
Drug_Control.pdf.
19
See 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5. The Preamble to the 1988 UN Convention
explains that the General Assembly of the United Nations requested the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs to hold initiate its thirty-first session to prepare a “ . . . draft convention against
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs which considers the various aspects of the problem as a whole,
and in particular, those not envisaged in existing international instruments . . . ”. Id.
20
See 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5 at 9. The preamble to the articles adopted by the
1988 Convention articulate that the “Parties to this Convention . . . recogniz[e] . . . that illicit
traffic is an international criminal activity, the suppression of which demands urgent attention
and the highest priority;” that the Parties are “Determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit
traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for
doing so”; and that the Parties are “Determined to improve international co-operation in the
suppression of illicit traffic by sea, [and] recogniz[e] that eradication of illicit traffic is a
collective responsibility of all States and that, to that end, co-ordinated action within the
framework of international co-operation is necessary.” Id.
21
See 1988 UN Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(1)(a), at 12. Article 3(1)(a) of the 1988
UN Convention requires that “Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: the
production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale,
delivery on any terms whatsoever . . . of any drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to
the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended, or the 1971
Convention.” Id. Marijuana is listed as one such substance under both Schedule I and Schedule
IV of the Single Convention, supra note 3, at 26.
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varying degrees of a drug’s potential abuse and its acceptance for medical use in
treatment.22 Marijuana is considered part of the Schedule I substance category23
which means it has a high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use in the
United States, and that there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under
medical supervision.24 Penalty provisions outlined under section 841 of the CSA
criminalize marijuana possession, with imprisonment terms ranging from five
years to life depending on the various factors outlined in the Act. 25 Despite
changes in multiple state provisions regarding the legalization of medical
marijuana26, and the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana27, current
CSA provisions continue to categorize cannabis as a Schedule I substance and
criminalize its possession.
The State Perspective on Marijuana

In the United States marijuana is currently decriminalized in eighteen states,
medical marijuana is legalized in twenty-three states28 and recreational marijuana
is legalized in the states of Alaska, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Colorado
and Washington.29 While specifics vary from state to state, the decriminalization
of marijuana differs from current CSA provisions by not subjecting persons
found in possession of small amounts of marijuana to criminal records.30 States
that have decriminalized marijuana can still impose state regulatory laws and
civil fines on persons found in possession of the substance. Conversely, while
laws differ based on jurisdiction, legalizing marijuana removes most legal
ramifications associated with usage of the substance. 31 While particulars of
legislation detailing legalization differ between Colorado and Washington, both
states have implemented similar regulatory schemes regarding the usage,
possession and sale of marijuana. Since the focus of this Note is on the
legalization of marijuana, it will strictly focus on the state laws of Washington
and Colorado, the first government entities in the world to legalize marijuana.32
Both Colorado and Washington decided to reform their previous provisions
on marijuana for three reasons: public health and safety, elimination of black

22

CSA 21 U.S.C. § 811(c).
CSA 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I.
24
CSA 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(1).
25
CSA 21 U.S.C § 841 (2012).
26
LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN FINLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43164, STATE
LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2014)
(stating that over half the states and the District of Columbia have allowed for the use of
medical marijuana) [hereinafter STATE LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES].
27
Id. at 5.
28
State Medical Marijuana Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan.
29, 2015) http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
29
Marijuana Overview NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 23, 2014)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx.
30
STATE LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES, supra note 26, at 5.
31
Id.
32
A Liberal Drift, supra note 1.
23
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market sales and increasing overall tax revenue. 33 From a public health and
safety perspective, both states found previous marijuana regulatory laws to be an
inefficient use of law enforcement resources that could be better utilized by
targeting violent crimes instead. The states also determined that legalizing
marijuana by taxing it heavily would result in a decrease in black market sales
and an increase in tax revenue, thereby increasing funding for government social
assistance programs.
Washington I-502

Washington reformed its legislation through the introduction of Washington
Initiative 502 (I-502), which took effect on November 6, 2012 when the
legalization of marijuana was authorized by popular vote. 34
The I-502 gives the Washington State Liquor Control Board (“WSLCB”)
authority to grant licenses to three tiers of marijuana distribution sectors:
producers, processors and retailers. 35 Washington has mandated that all
recreational marijuana be purchased through a licensed retailer and that nonlicensed persons are not permitted to grow, produce or sell their own marijuana.
In order to be considered for a recreational marijuana license, the party applying
must have been a Washington resident for at least two years.36 However, nonWashington residents will be permitted to purchase a small amount of marijuana
for recreational use while in Washington. The general public can purchase
recreational marijuana in limited quantities and, similar to alcohol consumption,
the use of marijuana must be limited from public view.37 I-502 also implemented
a twenty-five percent excise tax to be compounded at each tier of the marijuana
supply chain on which consumers are expected to pay additional sales tax.
Current calculations estimate revenue generated within the first five years of the
introduction of recreational marijuana to reach two-billion dollars (USD).38
Colorado Amendment 64

Like the I-502, Colorado introduced Amendment 64 as a ballot initiative to
modify the statewide drug policy concerning cannabis. Now part of Article 18,
section 16 of the Colorado State Constitution, the amended law closely mimics
that of I-502. Major similarities include the three tier supply chain system, the
tax rate compounding on each tier of the supply chain with an additional sales
33

Matt Ferner, Why Marijuana Should Be Legalized: ‘Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol’
Campaign Discusses Why Pot Prohibition Has Been A Failure, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 28,
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/why-marijuana-should-be-legalized_n_1833
751.html.
34
Matt Sledge, Colorado, Washington Pot Legalization Deals Drug War Major Blow,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/colorado-was
hington-pot-legalization-_n_2086023.html.
35
See, e.g., Sedro-Wooley, Oregon Ordinance 1789-14 (Feb. 17, 2014). Recitals to SedroWooley City Ordinance stating that WSLCB began accepting applications for 1-502 licenses
on November 18, 2013. Retail sales of marijuana for recreational purposes began in 2014.
36
See Washington State Liquor Control Board, FAQs on I-502: Public Safety/Criminal,
http://www.liq.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502.
37
Id.
38
Id.
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tax for the end consumer 39 , and oversight of the Colorado state marijuana
regulatory system by the state liquor control board.
The Federal Response

Although there is an evident disparity between the recreational marijuana
initiatives passed in Washington and Colorado and federal CSA legislation,
President Obama has stated that the federal government has “bigger fish to fry,”
implying that pursuing marijuana users was not a priority for the federal
Department of Justice (DOJ). 40 Thus, the federal DOJ’s response to the
legalization of marijuana in Washington and Colorado has been to not challenge
state laws based on the condition that states will “implement strong and effective
regulatory and enforcement systems.”41 The DOJ has also reserved its right to
file a lawsuit at a later date since the states’ regulation of marijuana is still
considered illegal under the CSA.42
While the DOJ has left the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and
Washington unchallenged, federal prosecution relating to the use of marijuana
will still be strictly enforced in eight scenarios. These eight high-priority areas
include: the distribution of marijuana to minors; revenue from the sale of
marijuana going to a criminal enterprise; diversion of marijuana from states
where it is legal to states where it is considered illegal; state-authorized
marijuana activity used as a cover for the trafficking of other illegal activity;
violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana;
drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health
consequences associated with marijuana use; growing of marijuana on public
lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by
marijuana production on public lands; and preventing marijuana possession or
use on federal property. 43 However, should the DOJ determine that “state
enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust,” it has the authority to shut down
state-licensed growers and retailers.44
Although the federal government has permitted state regulation of
recreational marijuana, a major point of contention does exist. Since marijuana
remains illegal under federal law, banks are prohibited from handling profits
39

Joseph Henchman, Taxing Marijuana: The Washington and Colorado Experience, TAX
FOUNDATION FISCAL FACT no. 437 at 1 (Aug. 2014) (Explaining that Colorado differs from
Washington in that there is a 15% excise tax on each tier with sales tax being 10%).
40
Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington, Colorado
Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-doj_n_3837034.html [hereinafter
Holder].
41
Evan Perez, No Federal Challenge to Pot Legalization in Two States, CNN (Aug. 30,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/politics/holder-marijuana-laws/.
42
Sarah Kliff, Justice Dept. Won’t Stop States from Legalizing Pot. Here’s What That
Means, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/wp/2013/08/29/justice-dept-wont-stop-states-from-legalizing-pot-heres-what-that-means/.
43
Eric Holder, supra note 40.
44
Jacob Sullum, Justice Department Gives Yellow Light to Marijuana Legalization,
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2013/08/29/justice-depart
ment-gives-yellow-light-to-marijuana-legalization/.
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from marijuana sales due to anti-money-laundering rules. 45 This means that
marijuana shops will be unable to use basic banking services, such as checking
and savings accounts, making everyday business transactions nearly impossible.

III. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
By allowing the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and
Washington, the United States goes against the mandate of both the SCND46 and
the 1988 UN Convention.47 This results in problems on an international front.
International Response

In its annual report the INCB directly responded to the legalization of
marijuana in Colorado and Washington by explicitly stating: “the board reiterates
that the legalization of cannabis for non-medical, non-scientific purposes would
be in contravention to provisions of the 1961 convention as amended by 1972
protocol.” 48 In its overall recommendations the same report specifically drew
attention to the United States, urging the federal government to take the
“necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the international drug
control treaties on its entire territory.”49
Other than brief mention in the 2012 INCB report, the United States has not
faced international backlash regarding its disregard of the SCND50 and 1988 UN
Convention 51 provisions. Regarded as the current world superpower and an
advocate of international cooperation, the United States should proactively
reconcile the differences in its federal legislation and the international
agreements it is party to in order to avoid negative criticisms.52 Also, as a pioneer
in the field of marijuana legalization, many nations will look to the United States
for direction regarding future marijuana regulation.
Although amongst the first in its field, the United States should attempt to
learn from other nations that have implemented recreational marijuana regulatory
measures to determine which route it should take in meeting its national and
international obligations. To determine the best course of action for the United
States to take in ensuring compliance with the SCND 53 and the 1988 UN
Convention, 54 this Note analyzes three countries which have developed
recreational marijuana regulatory policies: the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
45

David Ingram, U.S. May Help Marijuana Shops Get Banking Services, REUTERS (Sept.
10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-usa-crime-marijuana-idUSBRE9891
EK20130910.
46
Single Convention, supra note 3.
47
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
48
INCB Annual Report, supra note 2, at 63.
49
Id. at 116.
50
Single Convention, supra note 3.
51
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
52
Robert Kagan, A Changing World Order? WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/-opinions/a-changing-world-order/2013/11/15/4ce39d1a-489
a-11e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.html.
53
Single Convention, supra note 3.
54
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
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While North Korea has also legalized marijuana, it is not an appropriate country
to study since its international obligations differ vastly from that of the United
States.55

IV. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
A. The Netherlands

While the Dutch have not legalized recreational marijuana, they have
decriminalized it. The Netherlands differs from other government states that have
decriminalized marijuana because of its coffee-shop policy. The policy allows
the sale of a limited quantity of marijuana per person per day in coffee shops that
are strictly regulated by government agencies.56 While this may seem contrary to
SCND 57 objectives, the Dutch federal legislation meets its international
requirements as it has a clause stating that the production, trafficking and
possession of marijuana are punishable offences. However, since the SCND 58
does not contain clauses which “concern the actual enforcement of the
legislation”, the coffee shop policy is not in contravention of the SCND.59,60 Best
stated by former Chief of Demand Reduction for the UN Drug Control
Programme Cindy Fazey, “the Conventions say that there must be an offence
under domestic criminal law, it does not say that the law has to be enforced, or
that when it is what sanctions should apply . . . ” 61 When the 1988 UN
Convention62 pressured countries to criminalize the possession of marijuana, the
Netherlands chose to ratify the provision “with reservation,” allowing the Dutch
to be part of the 1988 Convention but not be required to adhere to that specific
condition. Thus, the Dutch have been able to successfully allow for the sale and
possession of small amounts of marijuana while maintaining their international
agreements.
A major flaw with current Dutch law governing marijuana arises as a result
of the Dutch government strictly enforcing laws against the growing and
wholesaling of cannabis, making the production of marijuana illegal. Although
allowed up to five cannabis plants per person, this supply limitation does not
meet the needs of Dutch coffee shops. Therefore, by allowing people to buy and
sell a substance which cannot be legally produced in sufficient quantity to meet
market needs, the Dutch government is inadvertently promoting the use of a
black market. The government is essentially forcing coffee shop owners to
interact with criminals since there is no legal way for business owners to obtain
55
Adam Taylor, North Korea Has A Surprising Attitude To Marijuana, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Jan. 15, 2013, 8 p.m.), http://www.businessinsider.com/north-koreas-and-marijuana-2013-1.
56
Dutch Drug Policy, http://www.holland.com/us/tourism/article/dutch-drug-policy.htm.
57
Single Convention, supra note 3.
58
Id.
59
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, supra note 6 at 147.
60
Single Convention, supra note 3.
61
David Bewley-Taylor & Cindy Fazey, The Mechanics and Dynamics of the UN System
for International Drug Control, FORWARD THINKING ON DRUGS (March 14, 2003),
http://www.forward-thinking-on-drugs.org/review1.html.
62
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
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greater than 5g of marijuana. 63 When questioned about this evident failing in
regulatory policy, the former Dutch Minister of Health, Hedy D’Ancona, stated
that the government was “already so happy with what [it] had, that [it] did not
realize which problems [it] was also getting.”64
B. Portugal

Like the Netherlands, Portugal too decriminalized the use of recreational
marijuana. However, Portugal went one step further and in addition to
decriminalizing marijuana, it also decriminalized all other illicit substances. The
new law, which came into effect in 2001, was a government strategy focused on
encouraging drug abusers to seek treatment instead of punishing them.65 While
the sale and trafficking of illegal drugs still mandates criminal conviction, the
new law, in principle, trumped 1988 UN Convention 66 provisions which
encouraged criminalization of the use and possession of illicit substances, since
the law made use and possession of up to ten days worth of a drug an
administrative offence instead of a criminal offence. 67 However, the United
Nations cannot speak against the Portugal’s actions of decriminalizing all illicit
substances as Article 3(2) of the 1988 UN Convention68 states that all measures
adopted by a signatory state are “subject to [domestic] constitutional principles
and the basic concepts of [domestic] legal systems.”69 Therefore, Portugal can
adopt a modest punitive criminal justice approach to drug possession without
breaching its international obligations. 70
Ten years after the law on decriminalization of illicit drugs was passed,
Portugal has seen a significant improvement in the country’s drug problems.71
Portugal is unique in the sense that it did not implement decriminalization as a
way to combat an increase in public usage of cannabis but rather, aimed to
provide treatment to those individuals that need it most. As stated by Mr.
Goulao, President of the Portuguese Drug Institute, in removing the “fear and
stigma” of criminal punishment drug users are encouraged to seek the help they

63

Dutch Coffee Shop Fined 10m Euros for Breaking Drug Law, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25,
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8587576.stm.
64
JEAN-PAUL GRUND & JOOST BREEKSMA, COFFEE SHOPS AND COMPROMISE 31 (2013).
65
Portugal
Legalises
Drug
Use,
BBC
NEWS
(July
7,
2000),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/823257.stm.
66
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
67
EMCDDA, Drug Policy Profiles: Portugal, EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR
DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION (June 2011), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drugpolicy-profiles/portugal.
68
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
69
Id.
70
Steve Rolles & Niamh Eastwood, Drug Decriminalisation Policies in Practice: A
DRUG
POLICY
FOUNDATION
(2009),
Global
Summary,
TRANSFERM
http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/drug-decriminalisation-policies-practice-globalsummary.
71
Since 2001 cases involving heroin dropped from 33% to 13% in 2008. See id., p. 1004.
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need.72 It was with the intent of improving public health that Portugal decided to
change its drug policy.
C. Spain

Current Spanish law does not criminalize the possession of marijuana, but
does criminalize its sale.73 This regulatory system has resulted in the emergence
of cannabis “social clubs” (CSC’s), which are non-commercial entities with the
objective of providing its members with enough cannabis to meet their personal
needs. First established in 2002, these not-for-profit entities have various benefits
which include providing members a certain standard of quality marijuana,74 an
alternative to the unregulated marijuana black market, accountability, and job
creation. Membership can either be acquired through invitation by two preexisting members who are willing to guarantee that the party wishing to join is a
cannabis consumer or through presentation of a medical report which confirms
that the person has an illness for which cannabis use is recommended. Members
are not allowed to sell cannabis nor distribute it to minors. Spanish common law
has established that the possession of large quantities of cannabis does not
constitute a crime unless is done for the purpose for trafficking.75 This makes it
legally permissible for clubs to possess large amounts of cannabis at any one
time.
As a signatory of both the SCND76 and the 1988 UN Convention,77 Spanish
drug practices are still in compliance with both conventions’ requirements. This
is because Article 36 of the SCND78, which includes “possession” in its list of
punishable offences, has been internationally interpreted as possession for the
purpose of trafficking, not as possession for personal consumption. The 1988 UN
Convention79 interprets personal consumption as a form of possession and urges
state signatories to make all forms of possession a criminal offence. However,
this resulted in much controversy and thus, as stated earlier, 1988 UN
Convention 80 defers to the domestic law of a party state in providing that all
offences are to be prosecuted and punished in conformity with domestic law
under Article 3(2). 81 Furthermore, the European Union has permitted the
cultivation of marijuana for personal use under Article 2.2 of the Council’s

72

Towards a Ceasefire, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 23, 2013) http://www.economist.com/news
/international/21572184-experiments-legalisation-are-showing-what-post-war-approach-drugcontrol-could-look.
73
Id.
74
The Global Initiative for Drug Policy Reform: Spain, BECKLEY FOUNDATION,
http://reformdrugpolicy.com/-beckley-main-content/new-approaches/future-directions-fordrug-policy-reform/spain/.
75
Id.
76
Single Convention, supra note 3.
77
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
78
Single Convention, supra note 3.
79
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
80
Id.
81
Id.

198

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39, 2015]

Framework Decision, thus strengthening the clout of the Spanish government’s
marijuana provisions.82

V. VIABLE ALTERNATIVES
Since the United States’ national policy is currently in conflict with both the
SCND 83 and the 1988 UN Convention, 84 it must find a way to resolve the
discrepancies in order to meet its international commitments. However, one must
also consider whether international conventions dating back to 1961 have
become outdated and ineffective in regulating drug use, thus making them
impractical. Outlined below are the viable alternatives available to the United
States in fulfilling its international obligations and the potential actions available
to the United Nations should the United States not fulfil its requirements.
Alternatives available to the United States
1. Meet International Requirements

In attempts to abide by the international agreements it is a party to, the
United States could enforce its federal legislation regarding marijuana usage by
overriding the legalization of marijuana in Washington and Colorado. However,
this would likely result in backlash from both the citizens of the states and the
state government bodies. The backlash would result in exponential growth of the
marijuana black market, leading to an increase in police regulation and resulting
in a greater expenditure of tax payer dollars on enforcement.
2. Withdraw from International Conventions

The United States could take the polar opposite route of complete
conformity by withdrawing from the international agreements pertaining to
marijuana regulation in accordance with Article 46 of the SCND85 and Article 30
of the 1988 UN Convention. 86 Such a course of action would likely result in
international condemnation and could, in extreme cases, trigger the international
community to withdraw from economically associating with the country.
However, since the United States is the world superpower, other countries would
be less incentivized to express their disapproval given most nations’ economic,
social and political reliance upon the United States.
3. Denounce, then Re-ratify with Reservation

Although an unconventional route and not one that is necessarily viewed
upon favourably, the United States could denounce (i.e. withdraw) from the 1988
UN Convention 87 and then, like Netherlands, join the agreement with
82

Martin Alonso, Cannabis social clubs in Spain, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE at 4 (Jan.
2011),
http://druglawreform.info/en/about-us/in-the-media/item/2595-drug-club-spainsalternative-cannabis-economy.
83
Single Convention, supra note 3.
84
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
85
Single Convention, supra note 3.
86
1988 UN Convention, supra note 5.
87
Id.

Bushan – An Evaluation of the Effects of the Legalization of Marijuana

199

“reservation” on the provisions concerning the use of marijuana. Should the U.N.
conclude that the United States is violating the SCND,88 then the United States
could use the case of the Netherlands as an example. Since the Netherlands has a
law on the books stating that trafficking and possessing marijuana is illegal, it
has met the technical requirements of the Convention even though it does not
enforce its legislation to the extent desired by the UN. However, as noted by the
Netherlands government, since the SCND 89 does not stipulate enforcement
provisions of its laws, the United States would not be in violation of any
requirements either.
While this alternative essentially discredits the SCND 90 and the 1988 UN
Conventions’91 since it allows countries to pick and choose which provisions to
abide by, it remains a valid alternative.92 Some nations could argue that by reratifying with a reservation for clauses regarding marijuana provisions, the
United States would violate the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 93
since its actions would be “incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty” under VCLT Article 19.94 However, as the world superpower, the United
States would likely have few nations speak against its actions.
Course of Action available to International Bodies

Since no country has ever been found to have violated international drug
control treaties, there is no precedent or formula for the United Nations to follow
in response to the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington. Thus,
whichever action the United Nations chooses in this case will set a precedent for
the international community.
1. International Court of Justice

While neither the SCND95 nor the 1988 UN Convention96 specify a penalty
for provision violators, SCND Article 48 does state that if a dispute arises
regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention, then a nation can
be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).97 The ICJ was established
by the United Nations in 1946 with the objective of settling, in accordance with
international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory
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opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs
and specialized agencies.98
While the ICJ can render a decision, its decisions are not enforceable without
the assistance of the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, should the United States
choose not to abide by the decision of the ICJ there would be no direct
repercussion for not doing so. Indirect consequences may take the form of the
international community’s disapproval of the nation’s actions, but because of the
strength of the United States, this disapproval would likely be limited.
Conversely, a refusal by the United States to act on an ICJ decision could
discredit the ICJ as a legitimate source of authority for future issues. In any
event, the United States is one of five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council and, as such, has a veto over any enforcement actions contemplated.
Thus, the United Nations should be wary in referring this issue to the ICJ.
2. Public Rebuke

Public rebuke covers a wide spectrum of potential actions. The INCB has
already publicly rebuked the United States, specifically the states of Colorado
and Washington, in its annual report. The INCB’s statements, which were
printed in U.S. newspapers, do not seem to have resulted in any proactive action
by the United States federal government. Raymond Yans, President of the INCB,
stated that by violating the SCND, 99 the United States has “[undermined] the
humanitarian aims of the drug-control system and are a threat to public health
and well being of society far beyond those states.”100
Should the international community feel strongly enough about the United
States violating convention provisions, it could choose to invoke economic
sanctions against the nation. However, as stated, since the United States is a
world power, this scenario seems extremely unlikely.
3. Amend the Requirements of the Affected Conventions

Any party can amend the SCND 101 under Article 47 and the 1988 UN
Convention102 under Article 31. Amendment provisions in both conventions fall
in line with Articles 39 and 40 of the Vienna Convention.103 While not often
done, if the United States can meet the stipulations required of it or if the United
Nations determines that an appropriate number of state parties are amenable to
amending the provisions in question, then the legalization of recreational
98
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marijuana could be accommodated. This would result in a significant change to
the international drug landscape, resulting in various countries reconsidering the
provisions governing recreational marijuana in their domestic jurisdiction.

VI. SUMMARY
Currently, the United Nations risks its reputation as an international
regulatory body since other nations may view the United States’ breach of treaty
provisions as an acceptable form of conduct. This taint in reputation could
potentially result in other nations breaching their United Nations treaty
commitments. Thus, it would be in the best interests of both the United Nations
and the United States to resolve their differences regarding the usage of
marijuana. Through an analysis of the SCND, 104 the 1988 UN Convention, 105
current federal and state perspectives regarding recreational marijuana in the
United States, and a summary of three countries which have implemented
marijuana regulations in their domestic state, this report has set forth the viable
alternatives available to both bodies in reconciling their differences. Conversely,
the United States risks international condemnation for violating its duties under
the international agreements it is party to. Regardless of which route is ultimately
taken, benefit is most likely to be had through mutual agreement.
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